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COMMENT
TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION-
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FAIR TRADE ACTS.
T WO RECENT cases in courts of record have raised the ques-
tion of whether or not resale price maintenance-as em-
bodied in the "Fair Trade Acts"-is again to be seriously
impeded by constitutional and other legal barriers.' This con-
flict has now been waged in the courts of the United States
for a period extending well over half a century. The North
Dakota Fair Trade Law is patterned on the California model
and was adopted in 1937.2 Its constitutionality has not yet been
tested.
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE IN THE UNITED STATES PRIOR
TO FAIR TRADE ACTS
Prior to the passage of the Sherman Act, cases coming be-
fore the federal courts had determined that resale price agree-
ments would be an acceptable method of merchandising. In
Fowle v. Parke- the Supreme Court of the United States held
it to be no defense that a contract contained an agreement
that one of the parties would sell only at specified prices and
that such a contract was enforceable despite the fact that it
might have been restraint of trade at common law. The court
cited Rousitlon v. Rousillon 4 which had declared contracts con-
taining partial restraints of trade to be enforceable provided
1 Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949);
Levine v. O'Connell, 275 App. Div. 217, 88 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1949).
2N. DAK. REv. CODE (1943) C. 51-11; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 1§16900-16905
(Deering, 1941). Although Fair Trade Laws and Unfair Trade Practice Laws
are, in a sense, complementary, they serve different purposes. Whereas the
Fair Trade Law governs vertical price relations, the Unfair Practices Law oper-
ates horizontally. Grether, Experience in California With Fair Trade Legisla-
tion Restricting Price Cutting, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 640 (1936). "Resale price main-
tenance as now practiced in intrastate commerce in 44 (45) states of the United
States and in interstate commerce . . . is a system of pricing a trademarked,
branded, or otherwise identified product for resale .. .Pursuant to lawi legaliz-
ing such arrangements, the manufacturer . . . prescribes by contract the mini-
mum price at which such product may be sold at wholesale "or at" retail in a
specified state, or in a specified portion thereof, with the effect of legally bind-
iig all other distributors in the specified area to conform to such price. This is
done by entering into 'a contract with at least one such distributor of such
product and serving'proper notice upon all other distributors who are thereupon
obligated to maintain: the minimum price named in the contract." FTC, REPIORT
ON REsALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 4-5 (1945).
: 131 U. S. 88 (1889).
414 Ch. D. 351 (1880).
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the partial restraint was reasonable. In the same year, :a lower
federal court held in Bowling v. Taylor' that the defendant
could not avoid suit based on his breach of an agreement not
to manufacture a certain type of merchandise on the ground
the contract contained a resale price maintenance agreement.
In 1892, in a prosecution under the Sherman Act where the
defendant had contracted to pay a rebate to dealers maintain-
ing prices, the court found that such a system was a reasonable
restraint of trade in the defendant's business. By. way of
dicta the court added that even if the dealer had required re-
sale price agreements instead of offering rebates, he would not
have been guilty of an unlawful restraint of trade under the
facts presented.7
Ten years later the courts found that the right to maintain
prices was incidental to the right to vend granted by patent
laws to a patentee and that control of resale prices under a
license to manufacture was therefore not in restraint of trade
and thus void under the Sherman Act.8 The same was not true
under the copyright law. One who cut prices in violation of
notices on copyrighted books could not be held liable as an
infringer" and in Bobbs-MerriU Co. v. Straus"° the court dis-
tinguished between infringement of a copyright and a patent,
saying that the protection afforded by statute to a patentee
was broader than that afforded the holder of a copyright.
However, a contract to maintain prices between a copyright
holder and his distributor was enforceable.- In several cases 1 2
strangers to price maintenance contracts were restrained from
inducing a breach of the agreement and in one instance the
distributors with whom the contract was made and those aid-
ing them were held liable for violation of the price fixing
agreement."
In the first case to suggest that patentees were not entitled
to special privileges in regard to resale price maintenance,
540 Fed. 4C4 (C. C. Conn. 1889).
4; In re Green, 52 Fed. 104 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1892).
Id. at 118.
s Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
9 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Snellenburg, 131 Fed. 530 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1904).
10210 U. S. 339; Scribner v. Straus, 210 U. S. 352 (1908).
11 Authors' and Newspapers' Ass'n v. O'Gorman Co., 147 Fed. 616 (C.C.R.I.
1906).
12 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Platt, 142- Fed. 606 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1906); Wells &
Richardson v. Abraham, 146 Fed. 190 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1906); Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. Jaynes Drug Co., 149 Fed. 838 (C.C. Mass. 1906).
13 li re Park, 138 Fed. 421 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1905).
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and that. such a right-if it existed-was derived solely from
the common law, .the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit found in J. D. Park & Sons v. Hartm an'" that
the system of contracts to fix-retail prices was an-unreasonable
restraint of trade under the common law and under the Sher-
man Act. It was this, decision which furnished the precedent
for the decision in Dr. Miles Medical. Co. v. Park Sons & Co.-
in which the Supreme Court said with regard to the resale
price. arrangement, ,.. complainant's plan falls within the
principle which condemns contracts of this class. It, in effect,
creates a combination, for the prohibited purposes. It. is an
article of commerce: and the rules concerning the freedom of
trade must be held to apply to it.... The complainant having
sold its product at prices satisfactory to itself, the public is en-
titled to whatever advantages may. be derived from competi-
tion in the subsequent traffic."'
In the year of the Miles Medical Company decision. three
cases- subjected price cutting sub-purchasers to restraining
injunctions by virtue of notices posted on patented articles
which specified the retail price.I When the courts held that
attempts to control -resale prices by notices attached to the
patented article were illegal under the Sherman Act, is the
Victor Talking Machine Company undertook to devise a means
of maintaining prices which would be within the rules laid
down by the courts. The system of first licensing dealers and
then attaching notices restricting the use of the articles rather
than the right to vend was employed, the theory being that
even if the royalties were paid in a lump sum, the title would
be retained and the resale price would actually be controlled
as in an agency relationship. In 1917, this device was held to
be a mere subterfuge, the title passing to the purchaser on
payment of the lumped royalties.0 The same court declared
resale price contracts on patented goods to be illegal and be-
yond the patent monopoly one year later. 21 Yet resale price
''153 Fed. 24 (6th Cir. 1907)..
'5220 U. S. 373 (1911).
I'; Id. at 408.
'7 Automatic-Pencil Sharpener Co.,.v. Goldsmith Bros., 190 Fed. 205 (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1911); Thos. A. Edison- v Smith Mercantile Co, 188 Fed. 925' (C.C.W.D.
Mich. .1911);. Waltham Watch Co. v. Keene., .91 Fed, 855. (C.C.S.D.N.Y,1.4911 ,
rev'd., 202 Fed. 225 D.C.N.Y. (1913), cert. denied, 232 U.S. 724 (1914).
,8 United States v. Keystone Wtcl. Case-Company, 218 Fed.. (502) (D.C.E.D.Pa. 1915)..i
19 Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243. U.S. 490 (1917).
o Boston Store v. American Gramaphone -Co., 246 U. S. 8 (1918).
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conitracts for patented. goods were enforced when an agency
relationship existed.2t
Other companies devised systems whereby the manufacturer
would refuse to sell to price cutters and thus maintain prices,
a practice approved in two decisions.*- This was one of the last
resale price maintenance systems to be attacked in ,the courts
prior to the enactment of fair. trade legislatiom The Federal
Trade Commission issued cease and desist orders against such
practices as making lists of price cutters, the use of agents
to investigate instances of price cutting, and the reporting
of names of price cutters to wholesale dealers so as to prevent
dealing with them.2 3 These orders issued under the Federal
Trade Commission Act2 4 were sustained with slight modifica-
tion2  and in effect permitted the manufacturer to refuse to
sell but did not permit identification of price cutters systema-
tically so as to make the refusals to sell effective.
ENACTMENT AND COURT TEST OF FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION
Another avenue to effective resale price maintenance lay
in the field of legislation with court enforcement of the laws
against offenders. As early as 1913 New Jersey enacted a law
having some of the elements of the present fair trade laws. '"
But it was not until 1931, when California enacted its fair
trade law,2 7 that the laws as they are now known came into
being. The California Act, as amended in 1933,*- became the
model for similar laws rapidly adopted in other states, " al-
though prior to the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sher-
21 United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
22 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); United States v.
Schrader's Son, 252 U.S. 85, 97, (1920).
23 SELIGMAN AND LovF, PRICE CUTTING AND PRICE MAINTENANCE 73 n. 14 (1932).
2138 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1940).
-54 See, E.G., FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) ; Hill Broth-
ers v. FTC, 9 F. 2d 481 (9th Cir. 1926).
2•1 N.J. Rev. Stat. 56:4-1 and 2 (1937).
27 Cal.,Bus., & Prof. Code §§16900-16905 (Deering, 1941).
28 Cal. Stat. 1933, p. 793. This amendment declared that selling, or advertising
for sale, at prices lower than those specified, by persons, whether parties to the
resale-contract or,not, was unfair competition and actionable at the suit of any
person damaged.
21) As of May 1, 1941, 45 states adopted some form of resale price maintenance
legislation. Only Missouri, Texas; Ve.rmont, and the District of Columbia did
not do so. FTC, REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE xxvii (1945). "The
statutes fall,-roughly, into two broad categories: (a) the "old type" acts, which
are patterned upon the pioneer California statute and (b) the "new type" acts-
which are based upon the model law diafted by the National . Association of
Retail Druggists in 1937." Notes and Legislation, Resale Price Maintea lace: The
Fair Trade Acts in Operation, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 284, 285, (1938).
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man Act 30 the various state fair trade laws were in conflict
with federal antitrust legislation if applied to interstate com-
merce.81
The Illinois Act was sustained by the Illinois Supreme Court
in two instances32 and on appeal to the United States Supreme
Court where the two cases were heard together, the court
decided in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Dis-
tillers Corp., (1) that the act did not infringe the doctrine
of previous decisions dealing with legislative price fixing
since the Illinois Act did not fix prices, (2) that there was no
violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, (3) that the act was not arbitrary, unfair, or unreason-
able, (4) that the buyer of trademarked goods could sell the
commodity at his own price under the act provided he do so
without using the goodwill as an aid, (5) that the act did not
deny the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment by conferring a privilege on producers
and owners of trademarked goods, and (6) that the phrases
used in the act were sufficiently definite so as not to mislead by
their meaning."
In New York, the fair trade law was first found to be un-
constitutional as applied to a merchant's sale of commodities
under a trademark or copyright on the ground that the state
could not fix prices where such articles were not affected with
the public interest.3' After the Old Dearborn decision these
cases were overruled, 6 the court saying that it had believed
the New York law to be a clear case of unauthorized restric-
tion upon the disposition of property, and that therefore it
was unconstitutional within the rules of former decisions of
:3050 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. 11 (1940).
::I Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912); Dr .Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
32 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 363 Ill. 610, 2
N.E. 2d 940 (1936); Joseph-Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Il1. 559, 2 N.E. 2d 929
(1936).
:::: 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
31 The California Act was similarly upheld in Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman,
5 Cal. 2d 446, 55 P. 2d 177; Pyroil Sales Co. v. Pep Boys, 5 Cal. 2d 784, 55 P. 2d
194 (1936), aff'd, 299 U.S. 198 (1936).
35 Doubleday Doran & Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 269 N.Y. 272, 199 N.E. 409;
Seeck & Kade, Inc. v. Tomshinsky, 269 N.Y. 613, 200 N.E. 23 (1936). New Jersey
likewise found its act unconstitutional: Johnson & Johnson v. Weissbard, 120
N.J. Eq. 314, 184 Atl. 783 (1936). But this was reversed in light of the Old Dear-
born decision. Johnson & Johnson v. Weissbard, 121 N.J. Eq. 585, 191 Ati. 873
(1937).
36 Bourjois Sales Corp v. Dorfman, 273 N.Y. 167, 7 N.E. 2d 30 (1937).
COMMENT
the United'States Supreme Court.7'The New York court then
bowed to the Supreme Court's interpretation of its own deci-
sions.23
The Florida court in its most recent decision, while recogniz-
ing the overwhelming precedent to the contrary, took the view
that the Florida Act went beyond the scope of the police power
and was arbitrary and unreasonable in favoring one economic
group over another when the general welfare was not to be
served under the current economic conditions."° The court
followed precedent laid down in decisions in which the United
States Supreme Court had held, (1) that legislative price
fixing is unconstitutional unless the business or property is
affected with a public interest, and (2) that legislative re-
strictions upon the right of a private dealer to fix his own
prices infringe the liberty of contract and is a taking of his
property without due process under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.4 0 The Supreme Court in the Old Dearborn case did not
apply the rule of these cases when the court found that the
Illinois Act did not fix prices, nor did it delegate such power
to private persons. 4'1
.ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION
There are ends other than that of protecting the consumer
to be considered' 2 but the primary aim of resale price main-
tenance does not appear to be the protection of property-
namely, the good will of the producer-as is popularly be-
lieved 43 and as the court indicated in the Old Dearborn case.14
:17 Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 359 (1928); Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minne-
sota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927); Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Rela-
tions, 262 U. S. 522 (1923).
38 Other jurisdictions upheld their fair trade laws on the authority of the Old
Dearborn case. Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A. 2d 176 (1939) ;
Ely Lilly Co. v. Saunders, 216 N. C. 163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1939); Weco Products Co.
v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474, 274 N.W. 426 (1937).
39 Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371. (Fla. 1949).
40.See note 37 supra.
4L299 U.S. 183, 192 (1936).
42 The producer, for example, has reason to fear that reduction of the mar-
gin of profit or the losses incurred in meeting price cutting competition will
cause retailers- either to refuse to handle his product or to push sales of other
products which have a greater margin of profit while the distributor may be
fighting to maintain the life of his business. SELIGMAN AND LOVE, PRICE CUTTING
AND PRICE MAINTENANCE, 183-99 (1932).
43 SELIGMAN AND LOVE, op. Cit. supra note 42, at 199, which intimates that since
the real incentive to resale price maintenance comes from the distributor, pro-
tection of good will is not the purpose...... "the Fair Trade Acts are concerned
not with tht -protection of the producer or owner of the trade mark, but with
the protection of certain types of wholesale and retail distributors. Their func-
NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
The Florida Court found. that th? "voluntary contract"
which the fair trade law provided was only concealment for
the prohibition of competition in trademarked goods. 45 This
finding is supported by a Federal Trade Commission Report
which said, "...the maintenance of retail prices at a fixed and
uniform level, prior to the passage of the Tydings-Miller
amendment, was against the policy of the antitrust laws, and
prior to the enactment of said amendment, a contract aimed
at obtaining this result was illegal. The •purpose of this amend-
ment.... is not to legalize contracts whose object is to prevent
predatory price cutting for an ulterior purpose. The Tydings-
Miller amendment legalizes contracts whose object is to re-
quire all dealers to sell at not less than the resale price stipu-
lated by contract without reference to their individual selling
costs or selling policies. 146 Among the arguments favoring re-
sale price maintenance are these: (1) The producer seeks only
to avoid competition with himself and other manufacturers
are free to undersell and thus leave a competitive market. (2)
The producer desires to protect the reputation of- his product.
(3) The stability of the market is lost by price cutting which
threatens the reasonable profit of retailers. (4) Price cut-
ting is a deception to the public, to lure customers into the
store.4 7 These and other arguments may be answered by ad-
mitting that loss-leader advertising may be used for unfair
or deceptive trade purposes. However, the fair trade laws do
not correct this objectionable feature of price competition
since the contracts entered into pursuant to such legislation
make no distinction between price competition which is eco-
nomically sound in the public interest and price competition
which is unfairly used in trade.48 "In practice ... resale price
tion and object is not to protect the good will symbolized by the trade mark,
but to alleviate the rigors of price competition between distributors." Shulman,
The Fair Trade Acts and the Law of Restrictive Agreements Affecting Chattels,
49 YALE L. J. 607, 615 (1940). In the same vein, see GRETHER, PRICE CONTROL
UNDER FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION 83 (1939).
44299 U.S. 183, 192 (1936).
45.Liquor Store v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371, 375 (Fla. 1949).
'; (italics added) FTC, REPORr ON RESALE. PRICE MAINTENANCE lxiv. (1945).
This finding -s°supported by recommendations of the Antitrust Division of the
United. States Department of Justice and by the recommendation of the Tem-
-',rary National Economic Committee, id. at lxiii.
Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 945, 988 (1928).
413 FTC, Report on.Resale Price Maintenance liv (1945). " . . . in the absence
of the effective government supervision in the public interest, resale price
mainliDenpnee, legalized to correct abuses of extreme price competition, is subject
to use as )meana of effecting enhancement of prices by secret agreements and
restraint of competition by coercive action ong the part of interested cooperating
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maintenance serves as a focal point for dealer cooperative
effort to bring pressure to bear on manufacturers to place
products under price maintenance at prices yielding dealer
margins satisfactorily to cooperating organized dealer
groups."' 9 Further, because fixing of prices of a single com-
modity invites competitors to fix lower prices, manufacturers
are not inclined to enforce a system of vertical prices unless
it is known that competing manufacturers are fixing prices
at known levels. They do not reach an agreement between
manufacturers as to prices but reach the same result by mak-
ing identical resale price agreements with their dealers50
THE NORTH DAKOTA FAIR TRADE LAW
The North Dakota Fair Trade Law"'lis subject to the same
objections raised in the Florida Court with reference to the
Florida Act. It may well be contended that the law is beneficial
to a certain class rather than the general public and therefore
violates the equal protection and privilege and immunities
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution,52 as well as similar provisions of the North Dakota
Constitution which provide that no citizen shall be granted
privileges and immunities not granted to all citizens on the
same terms and that life, liberty, and property shall not be
denied without due process.5 To be valid the statute must con-
form to state constitutional requirements, and where the
legislature, in enacting measures to cope with an emergency
under the police power, assumes power expressly forbidden
to it, the legislation is ineffective no matter how dire the emer-
gency. 5 Further the North Dakota constitution provides:
"Any combinations between individuals, corporations, associa-
tions,: or either, having for its object the controlling of prices
of any product of the soil or any article of manufacture or
commerce, or of the cost of exchange or transportation, is pro-
hibited and hereby declared unlawful and against public
policy. .... ".
trade groups of manufacturers ,wholesalers, and retailers in such ways and to
&uch an extent as to make it economically unsound and undesirable in a com-
petitive economy." Id. at liv-lxiv.
49 Id. at liv.
56 Id. at lxii.
•-.1 N. D. Rev. Code (1943) c. 51-11.
52U. S. Const. Amend. XIV.
5:: N. D. Const. Art I, §13, 20.
7,4 Cleveringa v. Klein, 6 N.D. 514, 526, 249 N.W. 118, 124 (1933).
r5 N.D. Const. Art VII, §146.
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The law may also be criticised as delegating to private per-
sons the power to fix prices without laying down a sufficient
standard and without supervision." Such a delegation of
power authorizes private persons to contract in restraint of
trade almost at will. The price set with a presumptively
friendly retailer goes uncontrolled.
WARD M. KIRBY
Third Year Law Student.
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - LAST CLEAR CHANCE IN
NORTH DAKOTA
T HE STRICT rules applied to the defense of contributory neg-
ligence have been modified in nearly all jurisdictions by
the doctrine Of last clear chance. The doctrine is generally at-
tributed to the celebrated English case of Davies v. Mann' in
which the plaintiff negligently turned his fettered donkey onto
a public highway where it was struck by the defendant. Total
responsibility for the injury was placed on the defendant by
the court which reasoned that "notwithstanding the previous
negligence of [the] . . .plaintiff . . .at the time the injury
was done, it might have been avoided by the exercise of reason-
able care." The principle of last clear chance thus invoked was
designed to mitigate the harsh rule of contributory negligence
announced in the earlier landmark case of Butterfield v. For-
rester.2
Whether the last clear chance doctrine is an exception to
the common law rule of contributory negligence, or instead
56,Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); Seattle Trust Co.
v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 122 (1928); Eubank v.-Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143
(1912).
-7 The Department of Justice reported. . . . if its Antitrust Division had
sufficient men and money to examine every resale price maintenance contract
• ..and to proced in every case in which the arrangement goes beyond the au-
thorizations of the Tydings-Miller amendment, there would be practically no
resale price maintenance contracts, and that, in the absence of such wholesale
law enforcement, the system of resale price legislation fosters restraints of
trade such as Congress never intended to sanction." FTC, REPORT ON RESALE
PRICE MAINTENANCE lxi (1945).
1 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842). Analysis of the case is found in
Schofield, Davies v. Mann; Theory of Contributory Negligence, 3 HARv. L. REV.
263 (1890). Comprehensive annotations on Last Clear Chance are found in 119
A. L. R. 1037 and 71 A.L.R. 365.
- 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809). Criticism of the contributory negligence
rule is sharply made in Malone, Comparative Negligenee, 6 LA. L. REv. 125 (1945)
and 82 CENT. L. J. 1)73 (1916).
